New trends in cognitive science

Course objectives

The aim of this course is to acquaint students with the newest trends in cognitive science research. Its units are drawn from the four domains in which contemporary work on cognition is concentrated – humans, animals, plants and fungi, and machines – each of which a cognitive scientist may take as a field of specialisation, and in all of which research has turned increasingly towards non-standard modes of cognition.

The competence the course builds is evaluative. Students acquire the means to assess the claim that some creature or artefact has a mind: to establish what has in fact been measured, to weigh competing explanations, to state what evidence would support the claim, and to proceed responsibly where the evidence is inconclusive. These are the skills required for a master's thesis and for subsequent critical work in the field, as well as for the everyday assessment of claims reported in the media.

Enrolment requirements and/or entry competences required for the course

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Learning outcomes at the level of the programme to which the course contributes

  • Explain major historical paradigms and recognize important new trends in cognitive science.
  • Integrate insights, methods, and levels of analysis across different disciplines into a unified framework for understanding the human mind and cognition in general.
  • Critically evaluate cognitive science findings and synthesize information to be employed in a collaborative professional environment.
  • Employ cognitive science insights in developing innovative, human-friendly and sustainable technological solutions.
  • Apply interdisciplinary approach in examining phenomena pertaining to cognition.
  • Design and conduct an interdisciplinary research project in cognitive science.
  • Employ diverse disciplinary tools in exploring and describing the nature of cognitive processes.

Course content (syllabus)

  1. Brains that break the rules. Variation beneath the standard account of the mind: aphantasia, the absence of an inner voice, olfaction without olfactory bulbs, and the split brain; the evidential standing of first-person report. (Zeman et al. 2020; Nedergaard & Lupyan 2024; Weiss et al. 2020; de Haan et al. 2020)
  2. Dreams you can talk to. What sleep and dreaming are for, and how a sleeping mind that cannot address us may be investigated: two-way exchange with lucid dreamers, dreams as noise that aids generalisation, and sleep in octopuses and in brainless Hydra. (Konkoly et al. 2021; Hoel 2021; Pophale et al. 2023; Kanaya et al. 2020)
  3. Do we think in words? Whether language is necessary for thought: the language network in non-linguistic tasks, mathematics and chess preserved after aphasia, and the bearing of large language models on innate grammar. (Fedorenko, Piantadosi & Gibson 2024; Mahowald et al. 2024)
  4. Babies and machines. Which knowledge may be acquired from experience and which must be present from the outset: networks trained on a single child's headcam footage, commonsense psychology in infants and in models, and children's capacity for innovation. (Orhan & Lake 2024; Stojnić et al. 2023; Yiu, Kosoy & Gopnik 2024)
  5. Decoding animal communication with machine learning. Whether other animals possess the components of language, and whether machine learning can find structure in communication we do not understand: sperm whale codas, name-like calls in elephants, and compositionality in bonobos. (Sharma et al. 2024; Andreas et al. 2022; Pardo et al. 2024; Berthet, Surbeck & Townsend 2025)
  6. Bees that play. What would show that a brain of fewer than a million neurons has something like a mind: play in the absence of reward, cross-modal recognition bearing on Molyneux's problem, and social learning of a task beyond individual innovation. (Galpayage Dona et al. 2022; Solvi, Gutierrez Al-Khudhairy & Chittka 2020; Bridges et al. 2024)
  7. Clever without a cortex. Intelligence, and possibly consciousness, in brains built unlike our own: planned vocal counting in crows, delay of gratification in cuttlefish, inter-arm signalling in octopuses, and the assessment of cephalopod sentience. (Liao et al. 2024; Schnell et al. 2021; Kuuspalu, Cody & Hale 2022; Schnell et al. 2026)
  8. Who can suffer? How it may be decided which animals feel pain, and what follows where the evidence is uncertain: dimensions of animal consciousness, criteria applied to decapods and insects, and mirror self-recognition in fish. (Birch, Schnell & Clayton 2020; Crump et al. 2022; Gibbons et al. 2022; Kohda et al. 2023)
  9. Plant minds and the pea controversy. Whether an organism without neurons can learn or feel: the case for plant cognition and its point-by-point rebuttal, an associative-learning result and the replication that failed to find it, and informative ultrasonic emission under stress. (Segundo-Ortin & Calvo 2022; Mallatt et al. 2021; Markel 2020 with Gagliano et al. 2020; Khait et al. 2023)
  10. Fungal memory and slime mould networks. Memory without a brain: information held in the structure of a mycelial network, electrical spiking read as language, fungal control of robots, and criteria for minimal cognition met without internal representation. (Fukasawa, Savoury & Boddy 2020; Šekrst 2026; Adamatzky 2022; Mishra et al. 2024)
  11. Minds in a dish. Whether cells cultured outside a body can learn or feel, and whether cognition admits of degree: the DishBrain experiments and the dispute over the word sentience, organoid intelligence and its ethics, and self-replicating xenobots. (Kagan et al. 2022 with Balci et al. 2023; Smirnova et al. 2023; Kriegman et al. 2021)
  12. Your brain on ChatGPT. Whether artificial intelligence extends cognition or displaces it: the extended mind applied to generative systems, set against measured effects on the depth of reasoning and on critical scrutiny. (Clark 2025; Stadler, Bannert & Sailer 2024; Lee et al. 2025)
  13. Planet of the apes (and lemurs). How much of the human mind is present in our nearest relatives, and how far back along the primate line it reaches. A concluding session with a guest, Dr Elena Račevska. No assigned reading.

Student responsibilities

Each student presents one paper from the reading list in the week in which its unit falls, setting out what the researchers did and how they reached their conclusions, where the evidence is strongest and where weakest, and closing with questions put to the class.

Participation is assessed throughout the semester. Students come to each class having read one paper of the unit in full and the abstracts of the remainder; a presenter reads the paper in full.

The final examination is an oral defence. The candidate is given a dossier on an organism of undetermined status and must judge, from evidence drawn from the course, whether it is cognitive, sentient or conscious, what protection it warrants, and on what grounds that judgement would be revised.

  • Paper presentation – 50%
  • Participation and discussion, throughout the semester – 30%
  • Final oral examination – 20%

Required literature